content of the existing and empirically adequate alternative, or self-
 inconsistent hypotheses, and so on.

There are even circumstances—and they occur rather frequently—
when argument loses its forward-looking aspect and becomes a
hindrance to progress. Nobody would claim that the teaching of small
children is exclusively a matter of argument (though argument may
enter into it, and should enter into it to a larger extent than is
customary), and almost everyone now agrees that what looks like a
result of reason—the mastery of a language, the existence of a richly
articulated perceptual world, logical ability—is due partly to
indoctrination and partly to a process of growth that proceeds with the
force of natural law. And where arguments do seem to have an effect,
this is more often due to their physical repetition than to their semantic
content.

Having admitted this much, we must also concede the possibility
of non-argumentative growth in the adult as well as in (the theoretical
parts of) institutions such as science, religion, prostitution, and so on.

1. One of the few thinkers to understand this feature of the development of
knowledge was Niels Bohr: ‘... he would never try to outline any finished picture, but
would patiently go through all the phases of the development of a problem, starting
from some apparent paradox, and gradually leading to its elucidation. In fact, he never
regarded achieved results in any other light than as starting points for further
exploration. In speculating about the prospects of some line of investigation, he would
dismiss the usual consideration of simplicity, elegance or even consistency with the
remark that such qualities can only be properly judged after [my italics] the event....'
L. Rosenfeld in Niels Bohr. His Life and Work as seen by his Friends and Colleagues,
S. Rosental (ed.), New York, 1967, p. 117. Now science is never a completed process,
therefore it is always ‘before’ the event. Hence simplicity, elegance or consistency are
never necessary conditions of (scientific) practice.

Considerations such as these are usually criticized by the childish remark that a
contradiction ‘entails’ everything. But contradictions do not ‘entail’ anything unless
people use them in certain ways. And people will use them as entailing everything only
if they accept some rather simple-minded rules of derivation. Scientists proposing
theories with logical faults and obtaining interesting results with their help (for
example: the results of early forms of the calculus; of a geometry where lines consist of
points, planes of lines and volumes of planes; the predictions of the older quantum
theory and of early forms of the quantum theory of radiation—and so on) evidently
prove according to different rules. The criticism therefore falls back on its authors
unless it can be shown that a logically decontaminated science has better results. Such
a demonstration is impossible. Logically perfect versions (if such versions exist)
usually arrive only long after the imperfect versions have enriched science by their
contributions. For example, wave mechanics was not a ‘logical reconstruction’ of
preceding theories; it was an attempt to preserve their achievements and to solve the
physical problems that had arisen from their use. Both the achievements and the
problems were produced in a way very different from the ways of those who want to
subject everything to the tyranny of ‘logic’.

This liberal practice, I repeat, is not just a fact of the history of
science. It is both reasonable and absolutely necessary for the growth of
knowledge. More specifically, one can show the following: given any
rule, however ‘fundamental’ or ‘rational’, there are always cir-
stances when it is advisable not only to ignore the rule, but to
adopt its opposite. For example, there are circumstances when it is
advisable to introduce, elaborate, and defend ad hoc hypotheses, or
hypotheses which contradict well-established and generally accepted
experimental results, or hypotheses whose content is smaller than the
We certainly cannot take it for granted that what is possible for a small child – to acquire new modes of behaviour on the slightest provocation, to slide into them without any noticeable effort – is beyond the reach of his elders. One should rather expect that catastrophic changes in the physical environment, wars, the breakdown of encompassing systems of morality, political revolutions, will transform adult reaction patterns as well, including important patterns of argumentation. Such a transformation may again be an entirely natural process and the only function of a rational argument may lie in the fact that it increases the mental tension that preceded and caused the behavioural outburst.

Now, if there are events, not necessarily arguments, which cause us to adopt new standards, including new and more complex forms of argumentation, is it then not up to the defenders of the status quo to provide, not just counter-arguments, but also contrary causes? ('Virtue without terror is ineffective,' says Robespierre.) And if the old forms of argumentation turn out to be too weak a cause, must not these defenders either give up or resort to stronger and more 'irrational' means? (It is very difficult, and perhaps entirely impossible, to combat the effects of brainwashing by argument.) Even the most puritanical rationalist will then be forced to stop reasoning and to use propaganda and coercion, not because some of his reasons have ceased to be valid, but because the psychological conditions which make them effective, and capable of influencing others, have disappeared. And what is the use of an argument that leaves people unmoved?

Of course, the problem never arises quite in this form. The teaching of standards and their defence never consists merely in putting them before the mind of the student and making them as clear as possible. The standards are supposed to have maximal causal efficacy as well. This makes it very difficult indeed to distinguish between the logical force and the material effect of an argument. Just as a well-trained pet will obey his master no matter how great the confusion in which he finds himself, and no matter how urgent the need to adopt new patterns of behaviour, so in the very same way a well-trained rationalist will obey the mental image of his master, he will conform to the standards of argumentation he has learned, he will adhere to these standards no matter how great the confusion in which he finds himself, and he will be quite incapable of realizing that what he regards as the 'voice of reason' is but a causal after-effect of the training he had received. He will be quite unable to discover that the appeal to reason to which he succumbs so readily is nothing but a political manoeuvre.

That interests, forces, propaganda and brainwashing techniques play a much greater role than is commonly believed in the growth of our knowledge and in the growth of science, can also be seen from an analysis of the relation between idea and action. It is often taken for granted that a clear and distinct understanding of new ideas precedes, and should precede, their formulation and their institutional expression. First, we have an idea, or a problem, then we act, i.e. either speak, or build, or destroy. Yet this is certainly not the way in which small children develop. They use words, they combine them, they play with them, until they grasp a meaning that has so far been beyond their reach. And the initial playful activity is an essential prerequisite of the final act of understanding. There is no reason why this mechanism should cease to function in the adult. We must expect, for example, that the idea of liberty could be made clear only by means of the very same actions, which were supposed to create liberty. Creation of a thing, and creation plus full understanding of a correct idea of the thing, are very often parts of one and the same indivisible process and cannot be separated without bringing the process to a stop. The process itself is not guided by a well-defined programme, and cannot be guided by such a programme, for it contains the conditions for the realization of all possible programmes. It is guided rather by a vague urge, by a 'passion' (Kierkegaard). The passion gives rise to specific behaviour which in turn creates the circumstances and the ideas necessary for analysing and explaining the process, for making it 'rational'.

The development of the Copernican point of view from Galileo to the 20th century is a perfect example of the situation I want to describe. We start with a strong belief that runs counter to contemporary reason and contemporary experience. The belief spreads and finds support in other beliefs which are equally unreasonable, if not more so (law of inertia; the telescope). Research now gets deflected in new directions, new kinds of instruments are built, 'evidence' is related to theories in new ways until there arises an ideology that is rich enough to provide independent arguments for any particular part of it and mobile enough to find such arguments whenever they seem to be required. We can say today that Galileo was on the right track, for his persistent pursuit of what once seemed to be a silly cosmology has by now created the material needed to defend it against all those who will accept a view only if it is told in a certain way and who will trust it only if it contains certain magical phrases, called 'observational reports'. And this is not an exception – it is the normal case: theories become clear and 'reasonable' only after incoherent parts of them have been used for a long time. Such
unreasonable, nonsensical, unmethodical foreplay thus turns out to be an unavoidable precondition of clarity and of empirical success.

Now, when we attempt to describe and to understand developments of this kind in a general way, we are, of course, obliged to appeal to the existing forms of speech which do not take them into account and which must be distorted, misused, beaten into new patterns in order to fit unforeseen situations (without a constant misuse of language there cannot be any discovery, any progress). Moreover, since the traditional categories are the gospel of everyday thinking (including ordinary scientific thinking) and of everyday practice, [such an attempt at understanding] in effect presents rules and forms of false thinking and action — false, that is, from the standpoint of (scientific) common sense. This is how \textit{dialectical thinking} arises as a form of thought that 'dissolves into nothing the detailed determinations of the understanding', formal logic included.

(Incidentally, it should be pointed out that my frequent use of such words as 'progress', 'advance', 'improvement', etc., does not mean that I claim to possess special knowledge about what is good and what is bad in the sciences and that I want to impose this knowledge upon my readers. \textit{Everyone can read the terms in his own way} and in accordance with the tradition to which he belongs. Thus for an empiricist, 'progress' will mean transition to a theory that provides direct empirical tests for most of its basic assumptions. Some people believe the quantum theory to be a theory of this kind. For others, 'progress' may mean unification and simplicity, perhaps even at the expense of empirical adequacy. This is how Einstein viewed the general theory of relativity. \textit{And my thesis is that anarchism helps to achieve progress in any one of the senses one cares to choose. Even a law-and-order science will succeed only if anarchistic moves are occasionally allowed to take place.})

It is clear, then, that the idea of a fixed method, or of a fixed theory of rationality, rests on too naive a view of man and his social surroundings. To those who look at the rich material provided by history, and who are not intent on impoverishing it in order to please their lower instincts, their craving for intellectual security in the form of clarity, precision, 'objectivity', 'truth', it will become clear that there is only one principle that can be defended under all circumstances and in all stages of human development. It is the principle: \textit{anything goes.}

This abstract principle must now be examined and explained in concrete detail.

\footnote{2. Herbert Marcuse, \textit{Reason and Revolution}, London, 1941, p. 130.}